HISTORY 135E

SPRING QUARTER, 2006
Department of History
University of California, Irvine
 Instructor:    Dr. Barbara J. Becker

 

Week 1.  Soul

excerpts from
On the Soul (c. 350 BCE)
by Aristotle (384-322 BCE)
trans. (1928) John Alexander Smith (1863-1939)

 
BOOK I

1. What is soul?

...[K]nowledge of the soul ... contributes greatly to the advance of truth in general, and, above all, to our understanding of Nature, for the soul is in some sense the principle of animal life.  Our aim is to grasp and understand, first its essential nature, and secondly its properties....

To attain any assured knowledge about the soul is one of the most difficult things in the world....  [W]ith what facts shall we begin the inquiry?...

First, no doubt, it is necessary to determine in which of the summa genera [major general categories of things] soul lies, what it is; is it ... a substance, or is it a [quality] or a [quantity], or some other of the remaining kinds of predicates which we have distinguished?  Further, does soul belong to the class of potential existents [something having the capacity to change or be changed -- a lump of clay, an acorn, a person with a skill], or is it not rather an actuality [something in a state of completion or perfection -- a piece of pottery, an oak tree, a person exercising his skill]?  Our answer to this question is of the greatest importance.

We must consider also whether soul is divisible or is without parts, and whether it is everywhere homogeneous or not; and if not homogeneous, whether its various forms are different specifically or generically:  up to the present time those who have discussed and investigated soul seem to have confined themselves to the human soul.

We must be careful not to ignore the question whether soul can be defined in a single unambiguous formula, as is the case with animal, or whether we must not give a separate formula for each of it, as we do for horse, dog, man, god....

Further, if what exists is not a plurality of souls, but a plurality of parts of one soul, which ought we to investigate first, the whole soul or its parts?  (It is also a difficult problem to decide which of these parts are in nature distinct from one another.)  Again, which ought we to investigate first, these parts or their functions, mind or thinking, the faculty or the act of sensation, and so on?  If the investigation of the functions precedes that of the parts, the further question suggests itself:  ought we not before either to consider the correlative objects, e.g. of sense or thought?...

A further problem presented by the affections of soul is this:  are they all affections of the complex of body and soul, or is there any one among them peculiar to the soul by itself?  To determine this is indispensable but difficult.  If we consider the majority of them, there seems to be no case in which the soul can act or be acted upon without involving the body; e.g. anger, courage, appetite, and sensation generally.  Thinking seems the most probable exception; but if this too proves to be a form of imagination or to be impossible without imagination, it too requires a body as a condition of its existence.

If there is any way of acting or being acted upon proper to soul, soul will be capable of separate existence; if there is none, its separate existence is impossible....  It therefore seems that all the affections of soul involve a body -- passion, gentleness, fear, pity, courage, joy, loving, and hating; in all these there is a concurrent affection of the body....

Consequently their definitions ought to correspond, e.g. anger should be defined as a certain mode of movement of such and such a body (or part or faculty of a body) by this or that cause and for this or that end.  That is precisely why the study of the soul must fall within the science of Nature, at least so far as in its affections it manifests this double character....

2. Views of our predecessors.

For our study of soul it is necessary ... to call into council the views of those of our predecessors who have declared any opinion on this subject, in order that we may profit by whatever is sound in their suggestions and avoid their errors.

The starting-point of our inquiry is an exposition of those characteristics which have chiefly been held to belong to soul in its very nature.  Two characteristic marks have above all others been recognized as distinguishing that which has soul in it from that which has not -- movement and sensation.  It may be said that these two are what our predecessors have fixed upon as characteristic of soul.

Some say that what originates movement is both pre-eminently and primarily soul; believing that what is not itself moved cannot originate movement in another, they arrived at the view that soul belongs to the class of things in movement.  This is what led Democritus to say that soul is a sort of fire or hot substance....

The doctrine of the Pythagoreans seems to rest upon the same ideas; some of them declared the motes in air, others what moved them, to be soul....

Similarly also Anaxagoras ... declares the moving cause of things to be soul....

Empedocles declares that [soul] is formed out of all his elements, each of them also being soul; his words are:

For 'tis by Earth we see Earth, by Water Water,
By Ether Ether divine, by Fire destructive Fire,
By Love Love, and Hate by cruel Hate.

In the same way Plato in the Timaeus fashions soul out of his elements; for like, he holds, is known by like, and things are formed out of the principles or elements, so that soul must be so too....

Some thinkers, accepting both premises, viz. that the soul is both originative of movement and cognitive, have compounded it of both and declared the soul to be a self-moving number.

As to the nature and number of the first principles opinions differ.  The difference is greatest between those who regard them as corporeal and those who regard them as incorporeal, and from both dissent those who make a blend and draw their principles from both sources.  The number of principles is also in dispute; some admit one only, others assert several.  There is a consequent diversity in their several accounts of soul; they assume, naturally enough, that what is in its own nature originative of movement must be among what is primordial.  That has led some to regard it as fire, for fire is the subtlest of the elements and nearest to incorporeality; further, in the most primary sense, fire both is moved and originates movement in all the others.

Democritus has expressed himself more ingeniously than the rest on the grounds for ascribing each of these two characters to soul; soul and mind are, he says, one and the same thing, and this thing must be one of the primary and indivisible bodies, and its power of originating movement must be due to its fineness of grain and the shape of its atoms; he says that of all the shapes the spherical is the most mobile, and that this is the shape of the particles of fire and mind.

Anaxagoras ... seems to distinguish between soul and mind, but in practice he treats them as a single substance, except that it is mind that he specially posits as the principle of all things; at any rate what he says is that mind alone of all that is simple, unmixed, and pure.  He assigns both characteristics, knowing and origination of movement, to the same principle, when he says that it was mind that set the whole in movement.

Thales ... seems to have held soul to be a motive force, since he said that the magnet has a soul in it because it moves the iron.

Diogenes (and others) held the soul to be air because he believed air to be finest in grain and a first principle....

Heraclitus too says that the first principle -- the 'warm exhalation' of which, according to him, everything else is composed -- is soul; further, that this exhalation is most incorporeal and in ceaseless flux; that what is in movement requires that what knows it should be in movement; and that all that is has its being essentially in movement (herein agreeing with the majority).

Alcmaeon ... says that it is immortal because it resembles 'the immortals,' and that this immortality belongs to it in virtue of its ceaseless movement; for all the 'things divine,' moon, sun, the planets, and the whole heavens, are in perpetual movement.

Of more superficial writers, some, e.g. Hippo, have pronounced it to be water; they seem to have argued from the fact that the seed of all animals is fluid....

Another group (Critias, for example) did hold it to be blood; they take perception to be the most characteristic attribute of soul, and hold that perceptiveness is due to the nature of blood....

All, then, it may be said, characterize the soul by three marks, Movement, Sensation, Incorporeality, and each of these is traced back to the first principles.  That is why (with one exception) all those who define the soul by its power of knowing make it either an element or constructed out of the elements.  The language they all use is similar; like, they say, is known by like; as the soul knows everything, they construct it out of all the principles....

All who acknowledge pairs of opposites among their principles, construct the soul also out of these contraries, while those who admit as principles only one contrary of each pair, e.g. either hot or cold, likewise make the soul some one of these....  Such are the traditional opinions concerning soul, together with the grounds on which they are maintained.

3. The Essence of Soul -- Movement?

We must begin our examination with movement; for doubtless, not only is it false that the essence of soul is correctly described by those who say that it is what moves (or is capable of moving) itself, but it is an impossibility that movement should be even an attribute of it....

[Theories characterizing the soul as movement involve] the following absurdity:  they all join the soul to a body, or place it in a body, without adding any specification of the reason of their union, or of the bodily conditions required for it.  Yet such explanation can scarcely be omitted; for some community of nature is presupposed by the fact that the one acts and the other is acted upon, the one moves and the other is moved; interaction always implies a special nature in the two interagents.  All, however, that these thinkers do is to describe the specific characteristics of the soul; they do not try to determine anything about the body which is to contain it, as if it were possible, as in the Pythagorean myths, that any soul could be clothed upon with any body -- an absurd view, for each body seems to have a form and shape of its own.  It is as absurd as to say that the art of carpentry could embody itself in flutes; each art must use its tools, each soul its body.

4. The Essence of Soul -- Harmony? Number?

There is yet another theory about soul, which has commended itself to many as no less probable than any of those we have hitherto mentioned, and has rendered public account of itself in the court of popular discussion.  Its supporters say that the soul is a kind of harmony, for (a) harmony is a blend or composition of contraries, and (b) the body is compounded out of contraries.  Harmony, however, is a certain proportion or composition of the constituents blended, and soul can be neither the one nor the other of these.  Further, the power of originating movement cannot belong to a harmony, while almost all concur in regarding this as a principal attribute of soul.  It is more appropriate to call health (or generally one of the good states of the body) a harmony than to predicate it of the soul.  The absurdity becomes most apparent when we try to attribute the active and passive affections of the soul to a harmony; the necessary readjustment of their conceptions is difficult....

Of all the opinions we have enumerated, by far the most unreasonable is that which declares the soul to be a self-moving number; it involves in the first place all the impossibilities which follow from regarding the soul as moved, and in the second special absurdities which follow from calling it a number.  How are we to imagine a unit being moved?  By what agency?  What sort of movement can be attributed to what is without parts or internal differences?  If the unit is both originative of movement and itself capable of being moved, it must contain difference....

5. The Essence of Soul -- Elements?

...It remains now to examine the doctrine that soul is composed of the elements.

The reason assigned for this doctrine is that thus the soul may perceive or come to know everything that is, but the theory necessarily involves itself in many impossibilities.  Its upholders assume that like is known only by like, and imagine that by declaring the soul to be composed of the elements they succeed in identifying the soul with all the things it is capable of apprehending.  But the elements are not the only things it knows; there are many others, or, more exactly, an infinite number of others, formed out of the elements....

Further, the word 'is' has many meanings:  it may be used of a ... substance, or of a [quantity], or of a [quality], or of any other of the kinds of predicates we have distinguished.  Does the soul consist of all of these or not?  It does not appear that all have common elements.  Is the soul formed out of those elements alone which enter into substances?  If so how will it be able to know each of the other kinds of thing?  Will it be said that each kind of thing has elements or principles of its own, and that the soul is formed out of the whole of these?  In that case, the soul must be a [quantity] and a [quality] and a substance.  But all that can be made out of the elements of a [quantity] is a [quantity], not a substance.  These (and others like them) are the consequences of the view that the soul is composed of all the elements....

In general, we may ask, Why has not everything a soul, since everything either is an element, or is formed out of one or several or all of the elements?....

The problem might also be raised, What is that which unifies the elements into a soul?....

All, both those who assert that the soul, because of its knowledge or perception of what is compounded out of the elements, and those who assert that it is of all things the most originative of movement, fail to take into consideration all kinds of soul.  In fact (1) not all beings that perceive can originate movement; there appear to be certain animals which are stationary, and yet local movement is the only one, so it seems, which the soul originates in animals.  And (2) the same objection holds against all those who construct mind and the perceptive faculty out of the elements; for it appears that plants live, and yet are not endowed with locomotion or perception, while a large number of animals are without discourse of reason.  Even if these points were waived and mind admitted to be a part of the soul (and so too the perceptive faculty), still, even so, there would be kinds and parts of soul of which they had failed to give any account.

The same objection lies against the view expressed in the 'Orphic' poems:  there it is said that the soul comes in from the whole when breathing takes place, being borne in upon the winds.  Now this cannot take place in the case of plants, nor indeed in the case of certain classes of animal, for not all classes of animal breathe.  This fact has escaped the notice of the holders of this view.

If we must construct the soul out of the elements, there is no necessity to suppose that all the elements enter into its construction; one element in each pair of contraries will suffice to enable it to know both that element itself and its contrary....

Certain thinkers say that soul is intermingled in the whole universe, and it is perhaps for that reason that Thales came to the opinion that all things are full of gods.  This presents some difficulties:  Why does the soul when it resides in air or fire not form an animal, while it does so when it resides in mixtures of the elements, and that although it is held to be of higher quality when contained in the former?  (One might add the question, why the soul in air is maintained to be higher and more immortal than that in animals.)  Both possible ways of replying to the former question lead to absurdity or paradox; for it is beyond paradox to say that fire or air is an animal, and it is absurd to refuse the name of animal to what has soul in it.  The opinion that the elements have soul in them seems to have arisen from the doctrine that a whole must be homogeneous with its parts.  If it is true that animals become animate by drawing into themselves a portion of what surrounds them, the partisans of this view are bound to say that the soul of the Whole too is homogeneous with all its parts.  If the air sucked in is homogeneous, but soul heterogeneous, clearly while some part of soul will exist in the inbreathed air, some other part will not.  The soul must either be homogeneous, or such that there are some parts of the Whole in which it is not to be found.

From what has been said it is now clear that knowing as an attribute of soul cannot be explained by soul's being composed of the elements, and that it is neither sound nor true to speak of soul as moved.  But since (a) knowing, perceiving, opining, and further (b) desiring, wishing, and generally all other modes of appetition, belong to soul, and (c) the local movements of animals, and (d) growth, maturity, and decay are produced by the soul, we must ask whether each of these is an attribute of the soul as a whole, i.e. whether it is with the whole soul we think, perceive, move ourselves, act or are acted upon, or whether each of them requires a different part of the soul?  So too with regard to life.  Does it depend on one of the parts of soul?  Or is it dependent on more than one?  Or on all?  Or has it some quite other cause?

Some hold that the soul is divisible, and that one part thinks, another desires.  If, then, its nature admits of its being divided, what can it be that holds the parts together?  Surely not the body; on the contrary it seems rather to be the soul that holds the body together; at any rate when the soul departs the body disintegrates and decays.  If, then, there is something else which makes the soul one, this unifying agency would have the best right to the name of soul, and we shall have to repeat for it the question:  Is it one or multipartite?  If it is one, why not at once admit that 'the soul' is one?  If it has parts, once more the question must be put:  What holds its parts together, and so ad infinitum?

The question might also be raised about the parts of the soul:  What is the separate role of each in relation to the body?  For, if the whole soul holds together the whole body, we should expect each part of the soul to hold together a part of the body.  But this seems an impossibility; it is difficult even to imagine what sort of bodily part mind will hold together, or how it will do this.

It is a fact of observation that plants and certain insects go on living when divided into segments; this means that each of the segments has a soul in it identical in species, though not numerically identical in the different segments, for both of the segments for a time possess the power of sensation and local movement.  That this does not last is not surprising, for they no longer possess the organs necessary for self-maintenance.  But, all the same, in each of the bodily parts there are present all the parts of soul, and the souls so present are homogeneous with one another and with the whole; this means that the several parts of the soul are indisseverable from one another, although the whole soul is divisible.  It seems also that the principle found in plants is also a kind of soul; for this is the only principle which is common to both animals and plants; and this exists in isolation from the principle of sensation, though there nothing which has the latter without the former.

BOOK II

1. The nature of soul.

Let the foregoing suffice as our account of the views concerning the soul which have been handed on by our predecessors; let us now dismiss them and make as it were a completely fresh start, endeavouring to give a precise answer to the question, What is soul?....

Of natural bodies some have life in them, others not; by life we mean self-nutrition and growth (with its correlative decay).  It follows that every natural body which has life in it is a substance in the sense of a composite.

But since it is also a body of such and such a kind, viz. having life, the body cannot be soul; the body is the subject or matter, not what is attributed to it.  Hence the soul must be a substance in the sense of the form of a natural body having life potentially within it.  But substance is actuality, and thus soul is the actuality of a body as above characterized.  Now the word actuality has two senses corresponding respectively to the possession of knowledge and the actual exercise of knowledge.  It is obvious that the soul is actuality in the first sense, viz. that of knowledge as possessed, for both sleeping and waking presuppose the existence of soul, and of these waking corresponds to actual knowing, sleeping to knowledge possessed but not employed, and, in the history of the individual, knowledge comes before its employment or exercise.

That is why the soul is the first grade of actuality of a natural body having life potentially in it.  The body so described is a body which is organized....  If, then, we have to give a general formula applicable to all kinds of soul, we must describe it as the first grade of actuality of a natural organized body.  That is why we can wholly dismiss as unnecessary the question whether the soul and the body are one:  it is as meaningless as to ask whether the wax and the shape given to it by the stamp are one, or generally the matter of a thing and that of which it is the matter....  [Soul] is substance in the sense which corresponds to the definitive formula of a thing's essence.  That means that it is 'the essential whatness' of a body of the character just assigned....  Suppose that the eye were an animal -- sight would have been its soul, for sight is the substance or essence of the eye which corresponds to the formula, the eye being merely the matter of seeing; when seeing is removed the eye is no longer an eye, except in name -- it is no more a real eye than the eye of a statue or of a painted figure....

2. Things with soul display life.

...We resume our inquiry from a fresh starting-point by calling attention to the fact that what has soul in it differs from what has not, in that the former displays life.  Now this word has more than one sense, and provided any one alone of these is found in a thing we say that thing is living.  Living, that is, may mean thinking or perception or local movement and rest, or movement in the sense of nutrition, decay and growth.  Hence we think of plants also as living, for they are observed to possess in themselves an originative power through which they increase or decrease in all spatial directions; they grow up and down, and everything that grows increases its bulk alike in both directions or indeed in all, and continues to live so long as it can absorb nutriment.

This power of self-nutrition can be isolated from the other powers mentioned, but not they from it -- in mortal beings at least.  The fact is obvious in plants; for it is the only psychic power they possess....

[I]t is the possession of sensation that leads us for the first time to speak of living things as animals; for even those beings which possess no power of local movement but do possess the power of sensation we call animals and not merely living things.

The primary form of sense is touch, which belongs to all animals....  [The] soul is the source of these phenomena and is characterized by them, viz. by the powers of self-nutrition, sensation, thinking, and motivity....

3. Powers of living things.

Of the psychic powers above enumerated some kinds of living things, as we have said, possess all, some less than all, others one only....  Plants have none but the ... nutritive, while another order of living things has this plus the sensory....

The case of imagination is obscure; we must examine it later.

Certain kinds of animals possess in addition the power of locomotion, and still another order of animate beings, i.e. man and possibly another order like man or superior to him, the power of thinking, i.e. mind....  Hence we must ask in the case of each order of living things, What is its soul, i.e. What is the soul of plant, animal, man?....

4. Nutritive soul.

...It follows that first of all we must treat of nutrition and reproduction, for the nutritive soul is found along with all the others and is the most primitive and widely distributed power of soul, being indeed that one in virtue of which all are said to have life.

The acts in which it manifests itself are reproduction and the use of food -- reproduction, I say, because for any living thing that has reached its normal development and which is unmutilated, and whose mode of generation is not spontaneous, the most natural act is the production of another like itself, an animal producing an animal, a plant a plant, in order that, as far as its nature allows, it may partake in the eternal and divine.  That is the goal towards which all things strive, that for the sake of which they do whatsoever their nature renders possible....

The soul is ... (a) the source or origin of movement [i.e., locomotion, sensory response, growth, decay], it is (b) the end, it is (c) the essence of the whole living body....

Food has a power which is other than the power to increase the bulk of what is fed by it; ... it maintains the being of what is fed, and that continues to be what it is so long as the process of nutrition continues.  Further, it is the agent in generation, i.e. not the generation of the individual fed but the reproduction of another like it....

Hence the psychic power which we are now studying may be described as that which tends to maintain whatever has this power in it of continuing such as it was, and food helps it to do its work.  That is why, if deprived of food, it must cease to be....

5. Sensory soul.

...[L]et us now speak of sensation in the widest sense.  Sensation depends, as we have said, on a process of movement or affection from without, for it is held to be some sort of change of quality....

[A]t birth the living thing is, in respect of sensation, at the stage which corresponds to the possession of knowledge.  Actual sensation corresponds to the stage of the exercise of knowledge.  But between the two cases compared there is a difference; the objects that excite the sensory powers to activity, the seen, the heard, &c., are outside.  The ground of this difference is that what actual sensation apprehends is individuals, while what knowledge apprehends is universals, and these are in a sense within the soul.  That is why a man can exercise his knowledge when he wishes, but his sensation does not depend upon himself -- a sensible object must be there.  A similar statement must be made about our knowledge of what is sensible -- on the same ground, viz. that the sensible objects are individual and external....

BOOK III

3. Thinking soul

...[P]erceiving and practical thinking are not identical ...; for the former is universal in the animal world, the latter is found in only a small division of it.  Further, speculative thinking is also distinct from perceiving -- I mean that in which we find rightness and wrongness -- rightness in prudence, knowledge, true opinion, wrongness in their opposites; for perception of the special objects of sense is always free from error, and is found in all animals, while it is possible to think falsely as well as truly, and thought is found only where there is discourse of reason as well as sensibility.  For imagination is different from either perceiving or discursive thinking, though it is not found without sensation, or judgement without it.  That this activity is not the same kind of thinking as judgement is obvious.  For imagining lies within our own power whenever we wish (e.g. we can call up a picture, as in the practice of mnemonics by the use of mental images), but in forming opinions we are not free:  we cannot escape the alternative of falsehood or truth.  Further, when we think something to be fearful or threatening, emotion is immediately produced, and so too with what is encouraging; but when we merely imagine we remain as unaffected as persons who are looking at a painting of some dreadful or encouraging scene.  Again within the field of judgement itself we find varieties, knowledge, opinion, prudence, and their opposites....

That imagination is not sense is clear from the following considerations:  Sense is either a faculty or an activity, e.g. sight or seeing:  imagination takes place in the absence of both, as e.g. in dreams....  [S]ense is always present, imagination not.  If actual imagination and actual sensation were the same, imagination would be found in all the brutes:  this is held not to be the case; e.g. it is not found in ants or bees or grubs....

 
Go to:
  • "Vulcan's Marvels," from The Iliad, Book XVIII (6th c. BCE?) attributed to Homer (?)
Readings for Week
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Lecture Notes for
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