Study Questions (and answers!) for John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (written ≈ 1680, published 1690).
Second Treatise (Book II)
Ch. I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII (§77-87, 89), VIII (§95-97, 99, 119-20), IX (§123-27), XIII (§149, 156), XV (169-172), XVIII, XIXA note on reading
Locke’s explicit purpose for publishing the Two Treatises, as he indicates in the preface, was “to establish the Throne of our Great Restorer, Our present King William; to make good his Title, in the Consent of the People, which being the only one of all lawful Governments, he has more fully and clearly than any Prince in Christendom: And to justify to the World, the People of England, whose love of their Just and Natural Rights, with their Resolution to preserve them, saved the Nation when it was on the very brink of slavery and Ruine” (Preface).
His purpose for writing the Two Treatises, was, however, quite different. The work was written as a part of a political battle, the Exclusion Crisis. Locke did not put his name to it (many things were published anonymously, but Locke made a special point of not acknowledging the Two Treatises until he wrote his will). Sir Robert Filmer, Locke’s opponent, died in 1653, but Filmer’s work was published posthumously in 1680 for use by Locke’s opponents in the important political controversy that you will also see in John Dryden’s Absalom & Achitophel.
1. What question(s) would you add if you were setting up the SQ?
2. In Chapter I (§1), Locke summarizes his argument against Filmer. What is the form of Locke’s summary, and what does he gain by it?
The form of Locke’s summary is as follows: A. Locke denies everything Filmer claims about Adam’s dominion over the world. B. Next he says, but even if we accepted Adam’s dominion, there’s no reason to think his heirs inherited it. C. But even if we accepted that heirs had inherited, there was no way to tell which one. This goes on in the pattern of “I deny A”; but even if A is true, B doesn’t follow. But even if I concede B, C doesn’t follow.” Locke doesn’t actually concede anything: with this series of layered hypothetical concessions, he shows that Filmer’s argument could have nothing to do with contemporary political power.3. What is the “State of Nature” according to Locke (II, §4, 5)?
A “State of perfect Freedom to order [one’s] Actions, and dispose of [one’s] Possessions” ; “A State also of Equality, wherein all the Power and Jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another.” It is the state in which men live “together according to reason, without a common Superior on Earth, with Authority to judge between them” (§ 19). Or in Hobbes’s words, there no power “able to overawe them all.” Hobbes’s version of the state of nature (the “war of all against all”; “nasty, brutish, and short”) is in the background of Locke’s version.
4. Why isn’t the state of nature a state of license (II, §6-7)?
People have liberty but not to destroy themselves or other creatures in their care unless some reason greater (nobler) than bare Preservation presents itself. The State of Nature has law, and that law obliges everyone. Nature teaches that all people being equal, no one should “harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions” (§6).
5. What does it mean to say that in the state of nature, “every one has the Executive Power of the Law of Nature” (II, §8, 13)?
Exactly what it says. If one person violates the law of nature, all others have the right to “punish the Offender, and be Executioner of the Law of Nature” (§ 8). This is a little inconvenient—and it is precisely the inconveniences of living in the state of nature that cause people to make the sacrifice of full liberty to live in the protection of civil society.
(This idea is similar to, but not the same, as that of Hobbes. It will also tie in with our study of Freud, for whom the costs of civilization (though necessary to pay) include an unavoidable discontent.)6. Do people keep agreements in the state of nature (II, §14)?
Yes. Making and keeping agreements belongs to men qua men. But there is no power over them all to ensure that the agreements are kept.
7. How is a state of war different from the state of Nature (III, §16-18)?
The state of nature is livable, so long as everyone obeys the laws of nature. The state of War emerges when one person attempts to get absolute power over another. That power hinders the self-preservation of the latter. Anyone who is an enemy to a person’s self-preservation is in a state of war with that person.
8. Why do people leave the state of nature and put themselves into society (III, §21)? What terms are central to this move from nature to society?
To avoid the inconveniences of the state of nature. The state of nature, though not a state of war, is always likely to degenerate into a state of war. In civil society, all individuals give up their right to execute the laws of the state of nature in order to live in a society where an authority is set up who can adjudicate differences.
9. How does Locke explain ownership of property given that he starts with the view that at first God gave all things to all men in common (Ch. V, § 25 ff.)? For that matter, what does Locke mean by property (Ch. V; see also Ch. VII, §87)?
Every man has a property in his own person, and when he mixes his labor with something previously in the state of nature, that thing becomes his property (without the consent of others). Notice that this explanation makes special sense to an audience accustomed to the common-field system. Early on, each family had strips of land on which they produced what then belonged to them. Locke may also be calling to mind the practice of enclosing commons. (Locke imagines this a peaceful process in which no one took advantage of anyone else, so he obviously means an imaginary enclosure. Actual enclosure movements met with resistance and criticism.) Locke has to produce a theory of the origin of property because he is critiquing Filmer who makes the transmission of property also the transmission of sovereignty.
By property, Locke sometimes means portable or real property, but he also sometimes means something quite immaterial (like one’s religion).10. What does Locke seem to mean by “Common” and “Commons” (Ch. V)?
See above. He means some general sense of “common”—as all the earth was common. But he also refers to the Commons, land shared by the community. And he means uncultivated, not yet mixed with anyone’s labor, not yet converted to use.. See § 34 where “common” and “uncultivated” are parallel terms. And see Locke’s discussion of “Ground [that] is of so little value, without labour” (§36).11. “Thus in the beginning all the World was America” (II, V, §49): What does this mean?
America is something close to the state of nature (or in the early stages of emergence from it). Other references include § 14, 36, 43, 48. [It might be interesting to think about the way Locke’s phrasing echoes Genesis and John: “In the beginning, God . . .” and “In the beginning was the Word . . .” Locke’s is a political version of “In the beginning.”]For the America metaphor, you might want to compare John Donne’s Elegy XIX, “To his Mistris Going to Bed”:
Licence my roving hands, and let them go
Before, behind, between, above, below.
O, my America, my Newfoundland,
My kingdom, safest when with one man mann'd,
My mine of precious stones, my empery ;
How am I blest in thus discovering thee !
To enter in these bonds, is to be free ;
Then, where my hand is set, my soul shall be.12. Why do children not share in the full state of Equality (Bk. II, Ch. VI, §55, 57, 58)? Since this seems so obvious, why do you think Locke goes into it? What point does he make in §59? The son’s freedom is like the father’s. Is this a matter of inheritance or principle? See also the sections immediately following.
Children do not yet share in political equality for the obvious reason that they are not yet competent to do so. As Locke uses the term infant, it means not “pre-toddler” but “minor.” Because children are minors, their parents are still responsible for them. Locke stresses this point to emphasize that parents’ power is owing to the responsibility they have for children in their youth. It is in the nature of a duty, not an absolute power. The son’s freedom is like the father’s on principle, not because he inherits it from his father. They are, as Locke says, “Subjects of the same Law” (§59).
13. Given the basic equality of parents as parents, what accounts for the inequality of husband and wife? (See Bk. II, Ch. VII, §82).
In what must be one of the weakest possible defenses of gender discrimination, Locke says that the “Rule” has to be placed somewhere, so “it naturally falls to the Man’s share.” There can be no majority when only 2 people are concerned, so someone must have the deciding voice. Having insisted on the mother’s having joint parental status, Locke is especially interesting in providing no stronger a defense for male privilege here. Locke’s not including women in the “contract,” his giving men the final say, rests on no more than what happens “naturally”—that is, custom. Locke, at this point, takes the customs of his culture for granted and accepts family organization as he finds it. By making women’s place in the family a pre-social contract situation, Locke is open to a mild form of the charge of underwriting the sexual contract. More on this in the lecture.
14. What does master of a family mean? (See Bk. II, Ch. VII, §86).The family is the “household” or co-resident family, and the master is the head of it. It includes a conjugal unit if there is one, children, servants, relatives for the time they live in the house, and even boarders. The master has the responsibility for moral and economic governance. As Locke indicates, the power of the master of the family is no greater than the power of the mistress when head of the family falls to her (when there is no master). Locke was in this sense a member of the Earl of Shaftesbury’s “family,” and Shaftesbury was Locke’s “master.”
15. How does Locke use the term tacit consent (VIII, §119)?
Anyone who depends on the protection and privilege of laws (accepts the benefit of the laws) has tacitly consented to them.
16. What’s wrong with the state of nature (IX, §124-127)?
It’s a lot of trouble for every person to take on the executive powers of the law of nature. In the state of nature there are no laws agreed to by common consent; there is no disinterested judge; and people often do not have the power to enforce the laws themselves. These are the inconveniences of the state of nature.
17. See Ch. XV for a quick review of “paternal,” “political,” and “despotical”
power.This chapter provides a useful review. This chapter may belong to the early period of composition.
18. What’s the difference between usurped power and tyrannical power (XVIII, §199).
Usurped power is exercised by someone who has taken it away from the person who has the right to exercise it. But tyranny “is the exercise of Power beyond Right.” It is a power beyond law, a power that no one has the right to exercise. This is the power that principally interests Locke and in his view accounts for the conditions that threaten the government of the state.
19. Under what conditions may a prince be opposed (XVIII, §202-3; see the rest of these sections as well)?
When a prince exercises a power beyond law, he may be opposed. Notice that in Locke’s view the King and the constable are on an equal level here. Note also that he compares the King to a father. Does this mean he is reinstating the family-state analogy? Two answers: 1) No, because he has already established that the father has no sort of absolute political power in the family. The comparison rests on the father’s duty, not on the father’s power. 2) Yes, for a moment Locke does rest on the family-state analogy, after dissociating it entirely from absolute power.
20. How does Locke defend himself from the charge that his “hypothesis” in Ch. XIX “lays a ferment for frequent Rebellion” (§224)?
1) No more, Locke says, than any other hypothesis. Hypotheses do not cause rebellion; conditions on the ground do. If people are ill treated by arbitrary power, they will resist. 2) People don’t rebel over small things. It takes a “long train” of abuses of power to create rebellion. And, declares Locke, power located in the people “is the best fence against Rebellion.”