Far be it from her [Astell, the "reflector"] to stir up sedition of any sort, none can abhor it more; and she heartily wishes that our masters would pay their civil and ecclesiastical governors the same submission which they themselves exact from their domestic subjects. (362).
Nor can she imagine how she any way undermines the masculine empire, or blows the trumpet of rebellion to the moiety of mankind. Is it by exhorting women not to expect to have their own will in any thing, but to be entirely submissive, when once they have made choice of a lord and master, though he happen not to be so wise, so kind, or even so just a governor as was expected?
Nor can she imagine how she any way undermines the masculine empire, or blows the trumpet of rebellion to the moiety4 of mankind. Is it by exhorting women not to expect to have their own will in
any thing, but to be entirely submissive, when once they have made choice of a lord and master, though he happen not to be so wise, so kind, or even so just a governor as was expected? (362).
She did not indeed advise them to think his folly wisdom, nor his brutality that
love and worship he promised in his matrimonial oath (362).
However she did not in any manner prompt them to resist, or to abdicate the perjured spouse, though the laws of God and the land make special
provision for it, in a case wherein, as is to be feared, few men can truly plead not guilty. (362).
That the custom of the world has put women, generally speaking, into a state of subjection is not denied; but the right can no more be proved from the fact than the predominancy of vice can justify it. (363).
. . . a rational mind is too noble a being to be made for the sake and service of any creature. The service she at any time becomes obliged to pay to a man is only a business by the bye. Just as it may be any man’s business and duty to keep hogs, he was not made for this, but if he hires himself out to such an employment, he ought conscientiously to perform it. (363)
Nor can any thing be concluded to the contrary from St. Paul’s argument, I Cor. [11]. For he argues only for decency and order, according to the present custom and state of things. Taking his words strictly and literally, they prove too much, in that praying and [prophesying] in the Church are allowed the women, provided they do it with their head covered, as well as the men; and no inequality can be inferred from hence, neither from the gradation the apostle there uses, that the head of every man is Christ, and that the head of the woman is the man, and the head of Christ is God;8 it being evident from the form of baptism that there is no natural inferiority among the Divine Persons, but that they are in all things coequal. The apostle indeed adds that the man is the glory of God, and the woman the glory of the man, etc. But what does he infer from hence? He says not a word of inequality or natural inferiority, but concludes that a woman ought to cover her head and a man ought not to cover his, and that even nature itself
teaches us that if a man has long hair it is a shame unto him. Whatever the apostle’s argument proves in this place, nothing can be plainer than that there is much more said against the present fashion of men wearing long hair than for that supremacy they lay claim to. For by all that appears in the text, it is not so much a law of nature that women should obey men, as that men should not wear long hair. Now how can a Christian nation allow fashions contrary to the law of nature, forbidden by an apostle and declared by him to be a shame to man? (363-4).
The relation between the two sexes is mutual, and the dependence reciprocal, both of them depending entirely upon God, and upon Him only; which one would think is no great argument of the natural inferiority of either sex.
A truly great mind and such as is fit to govern, though it may stand on its right with its equals, and modestly expect what is due to it even from its superiors, yet it never contends with its inferiors, nor makes use of its superiority but to do them good. So that considering the just dignity of man, his great wisdom so conspicuous on all occasions! the goodness of his temper and reasonableness of all his commands, which make it a woman’s interest as well as duty to be observant and obedient in all things! that his prerogative is settled by an undoubted right and the prescription of many ages; it cannot be supposed that he should make frequent and insolent claims of an authority so well established and used with such moderation! nor give an impartial bystander (could such an one be found) any occasion from thence to suspect that he is inwardly conscious of the badness of his title; usurpers being always most desirous of recognitions and busy in imposing oaths, whereas a lawful prince contents himself with the usual
methods and securities. (370).
She then who marries ought to lay it down for an indisputable maxim that her husband must govern absolutely and entirely, and that she has nothing else to do but to please and obey. She must not attempt to divide his authority, or so much as dispute it; to struggle with her yoke will only make it gall the more; but must believe him wise and good and in all respects the best, at least he must be so to her. She who can’t do this is no way fit to be a wife, she may set up for that peculiar coronet the ancient fathers talked of, but is not qualified to receive that great reward which attends the eminent exercise of humility and self-denial, patience and resignation, the duties that a wife is called to.
But some refractory woman perhaps will say, how can this be? Is it possible for her to believe him wise and good who by a thousand demonstrations convinces her and all the world of the contrary? Did the bare name of husband confer sense on a man, and the mere being in authority infallibly qualify him for government, much might be done. But since a wise man and a husband are not terms convertible, and how loath soever one is to own it, matter of fact won’t allow us to deny that the head many times stands in need of the inferior’s brains to manage it, she must beg leave to be excused from such high thoughts of her sovereign, and if she submits to his power, it is not so much reason as necessity that compels her. (371).
But according to the rate that young women are educated, according to the way their time is spent, they are destined to folly and impertinence, to say no worse, and which is yet more inhuman, they are blamed for that ill conduct they are not suffered to avoid, and reproached for those faults they are in a manner forced into; so that if Heaven has bestowed any sense on them, no other use is made of it than to leave them without excuse. So much and no more of the world is shown them as serves to weaken and corrupt their minds; to give them wrong notions and busy them in mean pursuits; to disturb, not to regulate their passions; to make them timorous and dependent, and, in a word, fit for nothing else but to act a farce for the diversion of their governors. (372).